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Abstract 
Interdependence, collective identities and common institutions are the preconditions for 
the evolution of a pluralistic security community. While the interaction of the states of 
Southern Latin America already meets the first two criteria, this article focuses on the third 
one, particularly the common institutions of the regional defence and security sector. The 
bilaterally organised defence cooperation has been attested democratic deficiencies be-
cause military actors are over-proportionally represented in these committees. Military 
nationalism and an exaggerated notion of national sovereignty in the military academies 
of the region can be regarded as cooperation hampering qualifiers. Non-military threats 
(organised crime, transnational terrorism) have centripetal effects on the subregional co-
operation, which is structured multilaterally and shows a relatively high degree of institu-
tionalisation. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Sicherheitsgemeinschaft Mercosur:  
Die Institutionalisierung der regionalen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik 
Interdependenz, kollektive Identitäten und gemeinsame Institutionen bilden die Voraus-
setzungen für die Entstehung einer pluralistischen Sicherheitsgemeinschaft. Die beiden 
erstgenannten Kriterien werden in dem vorliegenden Artikel für die Interaktionen zwi-
schen den Staaten des südlichen Lateinamerika als gegeben betrachtet. Im Zentrum der 
Analyse stehen die gemeinsamen Institutionen im regionalen Sicherheits- und Verteidi-
gungssektor. Im Ergebnis werden der bilateral organisierten Verteidigungskooperation 
erhebliche demokratische Defizite attestiert, da militärische Akteure in den Kooperations-
gremien überproportional vertreten sind. Militärischer Nationalismus und die Überbewer-
tung nationaler Souveränität, insbesondere in den Militärakademien der Region, zeitigen 
eine kooperationshemmende Wirkung. Die nicht militärischen Bedrohungen (organisierte 
Kriminalität und transnationaler Terrorismus) wirken sich dagegen eher zentripetal auf 
die regionale Zusammenarbeit aus. Sie haben zur Entstehung multilateraler Mechanismen 
zu ihrer Eindämmung beigetragen, die einen relativ hohen Institutionalisierungsgrad 
aufweisen. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the most striking features of the political development of Southern Latin America 
over the last two decades is the close connection between democratisation, regional integra-
tion and security policy1 (see Hirst 1998, Rojas Aravena 1996). It is becoming increasingly 
obvious that geopolitical considerations and traditional threat scenarios between the states 
are of less importance. First steps of a security political agreement have been introduced 
such as arms control agreements, publication of military white books, mutual transparency 
of the defence budgets. The more resistant against regression these cooperative processes 
are, the more the assumption by Hurrell (see 1998) is confirmed that a regional security 
community in Southern Latin America exists between Argentina and Brazil or that it is 
                                                     
1  In the following the area of security policy includes all institutional and procedural aspects of po-
litical actions, which lead to the protection of the population against external dangers. This in-
cludes a) potential transnational, non-military threats in Southern Latin America (drug and arms 
trafficking, money laundering as forms of organised crime, transnational activities of guerrilla or-
ganisations, international terrorism, proliferation of means of mass destruction); b) defence poli-
cies including the protection of the territorial integrity of a state against external attacks carried 
out by force of arms; and c) all areas of foreign policies which aim at bilateral, subregional, conti-
nental or global cooperation in security matters, conflict resolution and the prevention of organ-
ised violent acts.  
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about to develop (critically of this Schmitter 1991, Hirst 1998). This paper will analyse the 
evolution of the potential pluralistic security community in Southern Latin America by 
modifying the qualifiers of Karl W. Deutsch (1957), whilst focusing on the institutionalisa-
tion of the intraregional defence and security policy cooperation. 
Achieving common rules on the regional level between smaller groups of nations is more 
likely than the unanimous and consensual acceptance of security policy rules within the 
world wide context, since these smaller groups have probably got partially parallel norma-
tive patterns from the beginning. Accordingly this applies even more to subregions such as 
Southern Latin America. After all the states of the subregion look back on a wide range of 
common historic experiences: The rule of colonial powers until the 19th century, the military 
dictatorships till the end of the 20th century and the following processes of democratisation. 
Additionally the states of the South of Latin America share a similar cultural background 
originating in their “Iberian roots” with Christian-catholic values. Collective historic and 
cultural experiences support the reciprocal understanding and the peaceful coordination of 
national interests. 
Academics and politicians regard the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) initiated by 
the Asunción treaty of 1991 consensually as the most successful integration project outside 
the OECD-area so far. It is true that the economic interlocking between the full members 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay as well as the associated member states Chile, 
Bolivia and Peru does not exclude political and economic divergences of interest. However, 
it limits the risk of security political tensions, since economic elites in the concerned coun-
tries and transnational companies would consider them to be a cost factor and a locational 
disadvantage. The close foreign political coordination – as shown by the harmonisation of 
the foreign trade policies between the Mercosur states – is diametrically opposed to the tra-
ditional threat scenarios between the states. 
Consequently politico-geographical considerations and traditional threatening scenarios 
between the countries in the South of Latin America are losing importance increasingly. First 
steps of a security political agreement have been introduced instead. They include the solu-
tion of the notorious borderline conflicts and the ratification of control agreements on nu-
clear, biological and chemical weapons in the 1990s. A binational border commission had 
been instructed to write a report on the remaining territorial questions. The 25 territorial 
divergences between Argentina and Chile existent until the change of the Chilean govern-
ment could almost be completely solved in agreement by this conflict solving mechanism. 
The last controversial territorial question in the South of Latin America concerning the so-
called hielos continentales has been settled by Argentina and Chile in 1999. 
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By the agreement from Mendoza between Argentina, Brazil and Chile in 1991 the dissemina-
tion, the possession and the use of biological and chemical weapons were prohibited. In the 
same year Argentina, Brazil and the international IAEA of the UN entered into a trilateral 
agreement, from which the Agência Brasileiro Argentina de Contabilidade e Controle de Materiais 
Nucleares (ABACC) based in Rio de Janeiro developed. By this agreement the signatory 
states committed themselves to an exclusively peaceful usage of their nuclear facilities. In 
doing so they put the treaty from Tlatelolco in force, which was already signed in 1968 for 
the building of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. In 1996 Brazil joined the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) already signed in 1968 between the nuclear powers. In this treaty 
Argentina and Chile had already committed themselves in 1994 respectively in 1995 not to 
strive for the possession of nuclear weapons. By signing the declaration from Potrero de los 
Funes in 1996 the Presidents of the Mercosur countries created a multilateral consultation 
and concertation mechanism concerning questions of international politics (Foro de Consulta 
y Concertación Política/Forum for Political Consultation and Concertation – FCCP). In 1999 
the member states of the Mercosur including Bolivia and Chile reminded of the political 
dimension of the integration alliance by the declaration from Ushuaia declaring the subre-
gion a peace zone (Zona de Paz). 
It is true that the international treaties mean considerable achievements in the field of the 
cooperative security, but they aim more at the enclosure of potential conflicts than the de-
velopment of collective security structures: The reduction of tensions and the reduced recip-
rocal perception of threat resulting from confidence building measures and regimes for arms 
control prevent the repeated development of mutual distrust and the revival of an power 
balance discourse (Hurrell 1998: 540). It must be taken into account that the relations be-
tween the neighbouring countries Brazil and Argentina as well as between Chile and Argen-
tina has mainly been marked by hostilities for almost two centuries. The respective 
neighbouring state held the primary potential of danger in the conflict hypotheses of these 
countries. The friendly relations between the countries in the South of Latin America, which 
could only develop after a protracted removal of the threatening scenarios and the military 
doctrines derived from them, have only existed since the beginning of the 1990s (see Flemes 
2003a). 
In spite of the rapprochement between the Mercosur countries no security political regime 
or another subregional security system has derived from the intraregional cooperation so 
far. Neither have the actors involved decided that the objective of the ongoing process 
should be the formalization or institutionalisation of the security and defence policy collabo-
ration. On the contrary this is about a widely open process, the result of which can hardly be 
forecasted by politicians and scientists. Therefore the first step has got to be the tracing of 
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the actual development of the international cooperation over the past years in order to de-
termine their degree of formalization and effect with respect to specific measures and coop-
eration forums. Only on this empirical foundation a hypothesis on the development of a 
pluralistic security community with the core countries Brazil, Argentina and Chile can be 
verified or disproved. But before examining the bi- and multilateral cooperation mecha-
nisms of the subregion in detail, a spotlight on the theoretical concept of security communi-
ties shall demonstrate how it can help explaining the security and defence policy coopera-
tion process in Southern Latin America. 
 
 
2. Applying Karl W. Deutsch’s Qualifiers of Security Communities: Interdependence, 
Collective Identities and Common Institutions 
According to Karl W. Deutsch (1961: 98) a security community is identified by the following 
features: 
“[…] a security community […] is a group that has become integrated, where integra-
tion is defined as the attainment of a sense of community, accompanied by formal or 
informal institutions or practices, sufficiently strong and widespread to assure peace-
ful change among members of a group with reasonable certainty over a long period of 
time.” 
Thus besides the security policy cooperation Deutsch (1957) had defined stable relations 
between the social environments of the states as characteristic of a security community. 
Deutsch considered the following components to be essential to a security community: (1) 
mutual interdependence within the intraregional relations, (2) a high degree of collective 
identity and common values as well as (3) a tight network of common institutions and stan-
dards, which regulates the relations and contribute to the peaceful conflict resolution. By the 
security and defence political processes of institutionalisation between Brazil and its partner 
states the presented study throws particularly light on the third component suggested by 
Deutsch. In the following it will be empirically justified, why it is assumed in this study that 
the intraregional relations in Southern Latin America already meet the first two conditions 
for the existence of a security community for the most part. 
(1) The mutual interdependence of the societies that proves to be particularly well devel-
oped in the sector of subregional economic relations in the context of the Mercosur is with-
out doubt an important basis for the security political rapprochement between the states of 
Southern Latin America. Aggregated data on trade, direct investments and capital flows 
underline the relatively high – with respect to a developing region – degree of economic 
integration of the subregion (see IMF 2001a, 2001b, IDB 2002a, 2002b, Lacarte/Granados 2004 
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as well as Mühlich 2004). Today the Mercosur is rated as the world’s third biggest trade 
block after the EU and the NAFTA (Gratius 2001: 42). 70% of Latin American foreign trade 
and the direct investments (Nunnenkamp 2003: 30f.) is transacted by the Mercosur. The 
member states’ volumes of trade show their relative economic interdependence on the one 
side and point out the asymmetries between the Mercsour-partners on the other side.2 By 
way of conclusion it can be said that the share of the intraregional trade in the entire foreign 
trade of the Mercosur has doubled between 1990 and 2000 and thus amounted already to 
more than 20% in the year 2000 (IDB 2002a: 26). By the end of 2004 the intraregional trade 
between the Mercosur states formed already a quarter of their entire foreign trade (Lacarte/ 
Granados 2004: 57), illustrating the upward tendency. 
Another aspect of the progressive economic interdependence implies the intraregional direct 
investments.3 Yoguel (see 1996) observes the development of transnational networks of en-
terprises in the Mercosur. Especially between Argentine and Brazilian smaller and medium 
sized enterprises in the sector of sugar production, in the petrochemical and the dairy indus-
try. While the development of regional networks between companies seems to be progress-
ing slowly, greater dynamics can be observed on the level of the business unions and cham-
bers of commerce (Pohl 2003: 94f.).4 Already in 1986 the central trade unions of Southern 
Latin America founded the Coordinadora de Centrales Sindicales del Cono Sur (CCSCS) as a re-
gional forum for discussion and cooperation.5 
(2) Especially the forms of the transnational cooperation in the subregional economic sector 
do not only represent the growing interdependence between the Mercosur states, but they 
also imply that the market economy is one of several common value systems of the societies 
of the Mercosur. According to Karl W. Deutsch (see 1957) mutual interdependence and 
                                                     
2  Paraguay, for example, transacts 70% of its foreign trade with the Mercosur states and Uruguay 
45%. In 2003 Argentina exported 34% of its total exports to the member states of the Mercosur after 
all. In contrast to this Brazil is far less dependent on its integration partners concerning trade, since 
merely 19% of its total exports were delivered to the Mercosur-area in 2003 (see Lacarte/ 
Granados 2004). 
3  More than 350 Brazilian enterprises are active in Argentina and more than 150 Argentine compa-
nies are active in Brazil (Eßer 2000: 4). Eßer regards these enterprises as motors of the economic 
integration in the Mercosur. According to Sangmeister (2001: 15) the considerable progresses on 
the micro level of the economic integration lead to an increasing institutionalisation of a 
Mercosur’s own entrepreneurship. 
4  In 1991, for example, the national unions of the industrial companies in the Mercosur founded the 
Consejo Industrial del Mercosur (CIM). Even various national industry associations (i.e. petrochemi-
cals and automobile industry) collaborate more intensely and represent their interests commonly 
at international forums (Hasenclever et al. 1999: 417, Casaburi et al. 1998: 15f.). 
5  Since the beginning of the 1990s the topics of the integration process have been gaining impor-
tance within the CCSCS. In June 1997 the trade unions of the Mercosur states organised the trade 
union- and social summit meeting of the Mecosur in Asuncion (Garnelo 1998: 51). Since then the 
Presidents of the national trade unions are meeting for regular conferences. 
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common institutions build necessary conditions for the development of a regional security 
community in the same way as collective values and standards. So the comprehensive ap-
proach by Deutsch relates to the formation of relations between states and their societies that 
are based on a “sense of community”, which is characterized among others by a high degree 
of collective identity and common values. Apart from the market economy particularly de-
mocracy and human rights are the values that associate the Mercosur states. Furthermore 
the “we-feeling” of the states of Southern Latin America is encouraged by common social 
problems (poverty and high income concentration) within the states and a common prefer-
ence of multilateral solutions as well as a high esteem for the international law within the 
international relations. 
According to opinion surveys today the citizens of Southern Latin America have mostly got 
a positive image of each other.6 The community feeling in the Mercosur states is underlined 
by congress surveys, for example, according to which two thirds of the interviewed Con-
gressmen of the Mercosur states support the subregional plans of integration by their gov-
ernments (Alcántara Sáez 2000: 9). By a survey of the Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones 
Internacionales (CARI) the majority of the interviewed persons – amongst them Argentine 
opinion leaders from society, politics, sciences an economy – regarded the subregional inte-
gration as most important foreign political objective out of a selection of twelve (CARI 
2002: 19).7 
(3) The development of institutions is attached with great importance in the formation of a 
regional security community. In contrast to the first mentioned criteria the process of institu-
tionalisation between the states of Southern Latin America – especially in the sector of secu-
rity- and defence policy – is not obvious, but has to be shown in the course of this article. 
The regional institutions must be strong enough in order to generate “mutually reliable ex-
pectations of peaceful change” (Deutsch 1957: 5). Force is ruled out as a means of conflict 
resolution. Stable and institutionalised cooperative relations between the political systems 
build the infrastructure for the overcoming of the security dilemma within the security 
community. 
The lacking institutionalisation of the cooperation between the states of Southern Latin 
America seems to counter the development of a subregional security community at first 
                                                     
6  By a survey carried out in the Mercosur states in 2004 by the Brazilian Institute for Opinion Re-
search (IBOPE) 65% of the interviewed Brazilians rated their Argentine neighbours as altogether 
positive. Even higher was the Brazilian approval of the Chileans (72%). In 2004 76% of the Argen-
tines and 69% of the Chileans had a positive image of Brazil (see IBOPE 2004). 
7  Inquiring about the meaning of the South American states for the regional security policy the Ar-
gentines assign the leading role in South America to the ABC-states. At the same time the greatest 
influence is awarded to Brazil, followed by Chile and Argentina (CARI 2002: 34).  
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sight. It is true that still a relatively small degree of economic and commercial political insti-
tutionalisation is ascribed to the Mercosur after the Mercosur Council and the Group of the 
Mercosur have been supplemented by a Technical Secretariat in Montevideo, a Revision 
Court in Asuncion as well as a Committee of Permanent Representatives (even a Mercosur 
Parliament is planned for the future). However the security political cooperation and its in-
stitutionalisation within the Mercosur is continuously underestimated in the hardly existent 
specific literature. 
 
 
3. The Institutionalisation of Mercosur’s Defence and Security Cooperation 
Ultimately a rising degree of cooperation can only be measured by the increase in the bilat-
eral and multilateral channels between the countries. This fact is taken into account in this 
article, which summarizes the bi- and multilateral cooperation forums of the subregion. At 
the same time the degree to which the analysed cooperation mechanisms are formalized and 
institutionalised is of crucial importance. Their multilateral character distinguishes the secu-
rity political collaboration forums that are supported by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the 
Home Offices, the Ministries of Justice and the Ministries of Finance of the subregion. Their 
multilateral structure allows the institutional integration of some of the security political 
cooperation mechanisms into the political Mercosur. 
The military and defence political collaboration, which applies mainly to the bilateral level 
and which the Ministries of Defence and the Armed Forces are in charge of in the first place, 
differs from it. In this context the question arises, if the present UN peace mission in Haiti 
can bring about a “multilateral turn” within the subregional defence political collaboration. 
After all there are also Argentine, Brazilian, Chilean, and Paraguayan as well as Uruguayan 
units involved in the peace mission among other South American army corps. An army gen-
eral of the regional power Brazil is in command of the Haiti-mission (MINUSTAH). In the 
following the bilaterally organised defence political cooperation will be analysed focussing 
the regional power Brazil. Because as the politically and militarily most important player the 
Amazon state is cooperating with nearly all South American states in defence politics. 
 
3.1. Brazil’s Defence Policy Cooperation between Dominant Armed Services and Marked 
Bilateralism 
During the 1980s the military cooperation in the continental context between Brazil and its 
neighbouring countries were still predominantly organized under the aegis of the Inter-
American Defence Board (IADB or Junta Interamericana de Defensa – JID) based in Washing-
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ton. Since the 1960s the Pentagon has invited the commanders in chief of the American 
armed services to regular meetings (such as the Conferencia de Ejércitos Americanos – CEA) in 
order to talk about the regional security situation and coordinate the activities of the military 
intelligences (Radseck 1998: 8). The first supranational manoeuvres of the region have also 
taken place in the context of the Inter-American meetings of the three branches of service: 
Naval exercises have been carried out bi-annually in the South Atlantic, in which Uruguay 
and the USA participated besides the ABC-countries. Until the end of the 1980s merely the 
Navy managed to realise a subregional military cooperation excluding the USA and apply-
ing to the technical sector only. So the Control Area Marítima Atlántico Sur-agreement 
(COAMAS) between the Mercosur countries agreed on the restricted exchange of informa-
tion between the naval units and the coordination of patrols in the South Atlantic. 
Since 1993 representatives of the Joint General Staffs of all Southern Latin American armed 
forces have been taking part in annual symposiums on strategic studies. The subject of the 
military cooperation on the subregional level represents the thread running through these 
conferences through the 1990s. Only at the X. Simposio de Estudios Estratégicos de los Estados 
Mayores Conjuntos y de la Defensa in 1997 in Montevideo, for instance, more than half of the 
contributions dealt with the theme “The Mercosur and the subregional security – Effects on 
the role of the Armed Forces”. Accordingly Radseck (1998: 9-13) observes an increase in the 
actors involved in the military cooperation from the 1990s, which meant a qualitative leap of 
the defence political collaboration in this case: Besides the armed services the joint general 
staffs and especially the civilianly run ministries of defence (in Brazil a ministry of that kind 
was only established in 1999) are called for action. The following paragraphs will show in 
what way this tendency can be traced by recent history. 
The military cross-border cooperation during the 1990s, which went far beyond the common 
degree of confidence building measures between the armed forces, is indication for the de-
velopment of a security community in the South of Latin America. The cooperation, for ex-
ample, included the exchange of officers between the national military institutions and mu-
tual technological support as well as common military exercises, which were carried out on 
a bilateral and subregional level (see Flemes 2004b). 
However, a starting institutionalisation of the military- and defence political cooperation can 
only be observed on a bilateral level. Since 2000 Brazil has been holding bilateral working 
groups for defence policy (Grupo de Trabalho Bilateral de Defesa – GTBD) with several coun-
tries of the subregion. Since 1995 the half-yearly sitting Comité Permanente de Seguridad 
(COMPERSEG) has been ensuring a continuous security political dialogue between Argen-
tina and Chile, in which representatives of the joint general staffs and civil actors from the 
ministries of foreign affairs and the ministries of defence cooperate. This committee paved 
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the way for a standardized methodology for the equalization of the defence budgets of the 
two countries supervised by the ECLAC. Since 1997 the Mecanismo de Consulta y Coordinación 
entre Brasil y Argentina en materia de Defensa y Seguridad Internacional (Brazilian-Argentine 
Consultation and Coordination Mechanism for International Security and Defence Issues – 
MCC) also sits in conference. The MCC is an Argentine-Brazilian security political coordina-
tion forum similar to the COMPERSEG where the participating ministers of foreign affairs 
and ministers of defence emphasize the necessity of the foundation of a security alliance in 
the context of the Mercosur.  
The different kinds of international cooperation between civilian and military actors imply 
that Argentina, Brazil and Chile do no longer perceive each other as a threat, but strive for a 
common protection against external dangers. These countries do not consider military vio-
lence as a means of solving conflicts any more: 
“On the military as well as the diplomatic level all actors involved are aware that dis-
pute with the neighbouring countries can impossibly be settled by military force […] 
military actors only talk of cooperation, not of integration on the defence sector” (Rial 
1994: 38). 
The more the observed cooperation processes turn out to be resistant to regression, the more 
indication there is for the assumption that a regional security community is about to develop 
in the South of Latin America with the core countries Argentina, Brazil and Chile.  
In the following the single forums of the defence political cooperation with Brazilian partici-
pation are analysed. It will be looked at the two military and defence political cooperation 
mechanisms introduced earlier at first. These cooperation forums that are chiefly coordi-
nated by the Ministries of Defence – including technical collaboration and personnel ex-
change between the armed services – are mainly of a bilateral nature. 
 
The Consultation Mechanism for International Security and Defence Issues (MCC)8 
In April 1997 Buenos Aires and Brasilia agreed to a future security political collaboration by 
a common memorandum (Memorandum de Entendimiento sobre Consulta y Coordinación). The 
Brazilian-Argentine Consultation and Coordination Mechanism for International Security 
and Defence Issues (MCC) was established in August 1997 with the Protocol from Itaipava 
                                                     
8  The majority of the information presented on the Mecanismo de Consulta y Coordinación entre Brasil y 
Argentina en materia de Defensa y Seguridad Internacional is in the Argentine as well as in the Brazil-
ian Ministry of Defence rated confidential and thus not accessible to the public. The following 
paragraphs are chiefly based on research interviews by the author with members of the Armed 
Forces, Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs and academic defence experts in Novem-
ber/December 2003 and in May/June 2004 in Brazil (see the list of interview partners), whom I 
would like to thank for their support at this point.  
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(Acta de Itaipava). The representatives of government agreed on annual meetings, which 
were to take place alternately in Argentina and Brazil. It was decided on the building of an 
executive secretary’s office, the Mecanismo de Análisis Estratégico (MAE). 
From the beginning the absence of a civilian ministry of defence in Brazil has contributed to 
an asymmetry within the bilateral relations, which is rather unusual for the actors involved. 
The ministry founded in 1999 has only got involved in the work of the bilateral groups more 
intensely over the last two years, especially in the operating level (MAE). With the starting 
consolidation of the structures of the still quite young ministry and the inherent capability to 
coordinate a greater regularity of the MAE-meetings can be noticed as well as a more ex-
plicit subject agenda since 2002. However, up until now the Argentine actors show greater 
initiative. They can refer to experiences already made at the bilateral defence cooperation 
with Chile (COMPERSEG) and are obviously more interested in the bilateral cooperation 
forum. Three of the so far four meetings of the MAE were organized by the Argentine gov-
ernment and took place in Buenos Aires. 
By this two aspects are addressed, which might complicate a further development and in-
tensification of the MCC: Asymmetries and diverging interests between the two countries 
and internal factors, such as different patterns of civil-military relations, which the late 
foundation of the Brazilian Ministry of Defence already points at. Another problem implies 
the lack of transparency of the investigated defence political committees. This problem could 
be solved by coupling to the academic community, which is equipped with a greater public 
reach. 
Divergent security political interests do not only result from the different military, political 
and economic potential of the two South American countries, but especially from the differ-
ent claims and aspirations. While the Argentines are increasingly keen on the subregional 
cooperation and mainly critical to a “special partnership” with the USA, as it had still been 
intended by Carlos Menem, the regional power Brazil is trying to diversify its international 
relations. Brazil’s turning to other regional powers (Russia, India, China, South Africa), 
which also implies security political components, is critically observed by the Argentine 
conservative side (see La Nación, 18 March, 2004). Argentina reproaches Brasilia for ulti-
mately pursuing global objectives and using the Mercosur merely as a medium to position 
herself as a global player. These voices are confirmed by Brazil’s sole claim for a permanent 
seat in the Security Council of the United Nations, should it be reformed. 
However, the moderate Brazilian engagement respectively the sluggish consolidation of the 
bilateral committees in the defence sector cannot only be explained by diverging roles 
within the international system. Comparative analyses come to the result that the civil su-
premacy in the Argentine case has developed the most since the country’s economic decline 
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under the military government, the lost Falkland-Conflict and the following discreditation 
of the Argentine Armed Forces (see Diamint 1999, Diamond/Plattner 1998, Heinz 2001, 
Hunter 1998, Pion-Berlin 2001). Nevertheless the Argentine Armed Forces do also have in-
fluence on the military and defence policy. Therefore the Argentine Ministry of Defence has 
hardly influence on structural changes within the military institutions. This is due to quickly 
fluctuating staff combined with a chaos concerning competences. In the international col-
laboration the Argentine armed services pursue the interests of their institutions to an ac-
cordingly great extent, since the Ministry of Defence expresses hardly any political targets 
that could focus the objectives of the armed services within the bi- or multilateral military 
cooperation. As far as that goes the Argentine Ministry of Defence is able to make the Army, 
Air Force and Navy proposals at the most, but not to exercise the command authority. Apart 
from the civil control deficit the Argentine Ministry of Defence is certified considerable func-
tional deficits at the implementation of defence political defaults that would have to precede 
the goal-directed intensification of the defence political cooperation (Radseck 2004a: 129).  
Previous analyses has already detected functional deficits of a similar kind in the Brazilian 
Ministry of Defence at the definition and implementation of the security and defence poli-
cies as well as a weak civil control over the Armed Forces. Up until today the defence policy 
has to be regarded as a military enclave in the Brazilian case (Flemes 2004a). Although the 
Brazilian political elites clearly state their willingness to intensify bilateral cooperation 
mechanisms with Argentina, such as the MCC and MAE, these efforts regularly peter out on 
the declarative level. One reason for that is the fact that numerous decisive positions in the 
Brazilian Ministry of Defence are held by conservative generals who fear a loss of their in-
fluence on the security and defence policy, should future decisions on the bilateral or subre-
gional level be made by political actors. 
As long as information and channels of communication of the bilateral military collaboration 
are almost exclusively controlled and kept secret by the military in the Brazilian Ministry of 
Defence, the generals continue to be in charge of the control monopoly within the bilateral 
defence political collaboration. The breaking up of this monopoly of the generals and the 
integration of civil actors (Parliament, media, sciences) in the discussion and decision mak-
ing processes is only possible, if the culture of secrecy is clearly restricted in the Brazilian 
sector of security and defence.  
 
The Bilateral Working Groups for Defence Policy 
Since its foundation the civilianly run Brazilian Ministry of Defence has initiated bilateral 
working groups for defence policy (Grupos de Trabalho Bilateral de Defesa – GTBD) with most 
South American countries. Those working groups that function as intergovernmental dis-
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cussion forums for defence political issues exist between Brazil and all the countries of the 
extended Mercosur – only Paraguay is excluded so far. Moreover Brazil has also been keep-
ing up bilateral working groups for defence policy with Peru and Venezuela since 2001. The 
GTBD between the Brazilian and Argentine Ministry of Defence was founded in July 2000 in 
Brasilia. On this occasion the two Ministers of Defence decided annual meetings – alter-
nately in Argentina and Brazil –, which should contribute to a more efficient bilateral coop-
eration on the defence sector. So far three meetings of the Argentine-Brazilian working 
group have taken place. The respective home government has delivered meeting-records.9  
The first conference of the Argentine-Brazilian cooperation forum for questions of defence 
took place on 26 October 2001 in Brasilia. Both delegations were headed by the Ministers of 
Defence (Geraldo Quintão, Brazil and José Horacio Jaunarena, Argentina). Apart from five 
officers there was only one diplomat – the Minister’s consultant Machado e Costa – in the 
Brazilian delegation. The delegation of the Argentine Minister of Defence reflected a more 
balanced image with four civilians and five members of the military. The officers involved 
were employed at various departments of the administrations – mainly in the Ministries of 
Defence – and did therefore not take part in the bilateral working groups as representatives 
of the Armed Forces. The following three subject areas reflect the agenda of the working 
group up to now: 
- Defence policy cooperation: 
All bilateral agreements and memoranda, all commonly performed manoeuvres, 
military exchange programs and defence policy meetings between Argentina and 
Brazil are coordinated by the GTBD. 
- Agreement on the Control of Non-Identified Air Crafts: 
By a bilateral agreement on the common control of the air space above the Argentine-
Brazilian state border the illegal air traffic between the two countries should be made 
more difficult, which is chiefly aimed at the drug and arms smuggling. The bilateral 
treaty mainly implies the improvement of the communication and coordination be-
tween the Argentine and Brazilian Air Force concerning the control of the common 
air space. 
- Establishment of a regional strategic centre for training and studies: 
The establishment of a regional strategic study centre is about an Argentine initia-
tive, which the Brazilian actors did not particularly appreciate. The Brazilian side 
                                                     
9  The author has only got access to the meeting-record of the first meeting of the Argentine-
Brazilian Grupo de Trabalho Bilateral de Defesa from 26 October 2001 in Brasilia. The following para-
graph is mainly based on the meeting-record, which the Brazilian Ministry of Defence has kindly 
made available. 
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pointed to the Centre for Strategic Studies (Centro de Estudos Estratégicos) within 
the Escola Superior de Guerra, which is subordinated to the Ministry of Defence, and at 
plans for an institute for defence policy within the Ministry of Defence in Brasilia. 
Thus the first priority should be to interlock already existing think tanks in the min-
istries of defence electronically in order to guarantee a permanent exchange of in-
formation. 
The Bilateral Working Group for Defence Policy between Brazil and Chile has already had 
the first meeting in December 2000 in Santiago de Chile. Both countries’ Ministers of De-
fence – Geraldo Quintão, Brazil and Mario Fernández, Chile – made the coordination of both 
countries’ defence political positions the main objective of the bilateral cooperation forum, 
which is meant to be realized by annual meetings10. While the Chilean delegation consisted 
of five civilians and nine members of the military, there was again only one civilian repre-
sentative amongst the Brazilian delegation of eight persons in total. Annual meetings of Bra-
zil’s and Chile’s Joint General Staffs were planned for the future. In addition to that the Bra-
zilian delegation suggested the establishment of sub-working groups, which should deal 
with issues of bilateral interest: Military cooperation, planning and organization, strategic 
intelligence as well as science, technology and arms industry. The results of the sub-working 
groups are to be presented at the annual meetings of the GTBD. 
 
The UN Peace Mission in Haiti: Heading towards a Multilateral Security and Defence Policy under 
Brazilian Leadership? 
The mission in Haiti might also have implications for the future defence political coopera-
tion between the South American countries. On the basis of the UN Resolution 1542 the Sta-
bilization Mission MINUSTAH has been installed in Haiti in June 2004. A Brazilian Army 
General is in command of the peace operation. The multilateral peacekeeping force headed 
by Brazil consists of 6,700 soldiers from 13 countries all together. Brazil deploys the biggest 
troop with 1,200 men, who are meant to protect the inhabitants’ security in Port au Prince. 
Chile provides a contingent of 600 soldiers who are responsible for the security in the 
Northern part of the country around Haiti’s second largest city Cap-Haitien. Argentina pro-
vides a battalion of 600 soldiers for the control of the former stronghold of rebels Gonaives. 
Uruguay’s battalion (also 600 soldiers) patrols in the Southern part of Haiti. Paraguayan, 
Bolivian and Peruvian units complete the South American contingent. Apart from Canada, 
                                                     
10  The author has only got access to the meeting-records of the first two meetings of the Brazilian-
Chilean Grupo de Trabalho Bilateral de Defesa from 14 December 2000 in Santiago de Chile and from 
13 November 2001 in Brasilia.  
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France and the USA – all of them had supported the previous interim mission (MIF) – Benin, 
Nepal and Croatia sent smaller units and single specialists to Haiti. 
The special representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations supervises the UN 
mission in Haiti. The former Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs Juan Gabriel Valdés is en-
trusted with this task. The stabilization of the security situation in the Caribbean state is the 
ultimate aim of the MINUSTAH in order to guarantee the realization of the presidential 
races planned for the end of 2005. In addition to the maintenance of law and democratic or-
der the disarmament of the around 25,000 rebels is the most difficult problem the blue berets 
are confronted with. In spring 2004 these rebels marched towards Port au Prince and finally 
forced the deposition of the authoritarian President Aristide who is said to have entered 
office by electoral fraud.  
Even if the disarmament of the civilians will only be little successful in the short-term,  
MINUSTAH is of great importance for the defence political cooperation in South America. 
Above all it has to be noticed that for the first time peacekeeping forces that consist almost 
exclusively of South American units carry out a peace mission of the United Nations headed 
by Brazil. The practical military cooperation between the South American governments has 
got the potential of introducing a turn to multilateralism within the subregional defence 
cooperation, which has so far mainly relied on bilateral structures. Even President da Silva 
and his then Minister of Defence Viegas have stressed this progress at a visit to the troops 
prior to the football match on 18 May 2004 in Port au Prine (see Estado de São Paulo, 19 
May, 2004). 
The Argentine President Nestor Kirchner went one step further. He understands the partici-
pation of Argentina, Brazil and Chile in the Haiti-mission as a permanent multilateral task 
force about to develop. The military units of the ABC-countries should first of all be avail-
able for UN mandated peace missions and build “the embryo of a common regional defence 
system” (see Estado de São Paulo, 18 May, 2004). The Argentine Minister of Defence Pam-
puro added that this was not yet about a military arm of the Mercosur, but the development 
headed towards defence political integration. At an informal meeting in Buenos Aires in 
May 2004 the Ministers of Defence of Argentina, Brazil and Chile had analysed the condi-
tions for the establishment of a permanent common troop contingent (ibid.). At a public 
symposium about security cooperation organized by the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation in Bra-
silia in June 2004 the then Chilean Minister of Defence Michelle Bachelet held the view that 
the cooperation structures between Argentina, Brazil and Chile should be designed in a 
flexible and multidimensional way for the time being. In fact Bachelet’s intended “flexible 
security architecture” implies that each of the three countries decides unilaterally, whether 
to cooperate in the bilateral, subregional or hemispheric context or to pursue several of these 
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options of the security and defence policy cooperation simultaneously. By this external ac-
tors would have the opportunity – by bilateral agreements with single South American 
countries – to cause discords between them and to disturb the subregional cooperation proc-
ess severely. This danger was very apparent at Argentina’s appointment as the special part-
ner of the NATO in 1997. 
A critical view shows differences between the attitudes of the Southern states of Latin Amer-
ica concerning the future structure of the security and defence policy cooperation. Since the 
voting out of Carlos Menem especially Argentina has been in favour of the development of a 
subregional security system beyond diplomatic declarations of intent. At the same time 
Chile represents an intercessor who first of all – due to its classic sovereignty understand-
ing – intends to build a solid frame work of bilateral security cooperation. Uruguay retreats 
from Brazil consciously at the peace mission in Haiti. The Uruguayan Minister of Defence 
Fau got a separate participation (força independente) of the Uruguayan contingent in the MI-
NUSTAH accepted by the UNO (see Correio Braziliense, 14 May, 2004). Headed by the big 
neighbour the small Mercosur member is obviously worried about its national profile. At 
the same time Brazil’s efforts are restrained, since the Amazon region, which is considered 
to be strategically vulnerable, is the first priority of Brasilia and a subregional security com-
munity with the Cono-Sur-countries would only imply a marginal increase of security in 
this respect. 
 
3.2. The Multilateral Containment of Transnational Threats in Mercosur 
The Mercosur states are confronted with a number of transnational threats. The protagonists 
of these dangers are no longer the states, but guerrillas, paramilitaries, the organized crime 
(especially drug and arms dealers) as well as international terrorists who possibly organize 
themselves within so called lawless areas. The containment of these new security risks – 
before developing into extensive military conflicts threatening the peace and prosperity of 
the region – is in the common interest of the states of a potential security community. To 
generate stability and progress in the South of Latin America in the future and to support 
the economic process of integration the security political cooperation between the countries 
of the South of Latin America will play an equally important role as the consolidation of 
democracy and the respect for the human rights do. 
The countries of the Mercosur show different degrees of political stability and varying insti-
tutional deficiencies. Only over the past years the national security policies have developed 
into public policies controlled by democratically legitimated actors. The states in the South 
of Latin America do not have a tradition of public debates on security political issues, since 
the Armed Forces have exclusively dominated this field of politics in the past. That is pre-
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cisely why the political institutions of the Mercosur countries are obliged to respond to new 
security risks and thus prevent that the Armed Forces respectively their intelligence services 
occupy this field of politics recently. Even more heavily weighs the argument that neither 
the transnationally organized crime nor the international terrorism can be contained by mili-
tary means only.  
The integration of a multitude of government actors into the foreign and security policy of 
the Mercosur countries implies a tendency resulting from the increasing virulence of trans-
national threats. Whereas the external agitation of the countries has so far been left to the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the Presidential Offices, today even the Home Offices, the 
Ministries of Justice, -Finance, -Economic Affairs and -Defence as well as police authorities 
regard themselves to be integrated into the international cooperation. The priority in con-
taining transnational security risks should be the institutionalised cooperation between 
these actors who are democratically legitimated by their societies. In order to guarantee an 
efficient cross-border collaboration the adjustment of the national legal systems is necessary 
in a second step. In doing so it has to be taken into account that the rule of law and particu-
larly the Mercosur citizens’ individual rights are not harmed. 
Since the mid-1990s a cooperative process of the containment of non-conventional security 
risks can be observed within the Mercosur, which has proven to be increasingly consistent in 
the recent times. To document the state of the subregional security political collaboration 
first of all the most significant security political cooperation forums already existing are in-
troduced by the FCCP and the Conference of the Home Secretaries. The degree of institu-
tionalisation of these multilateral institutions is of vital importance for the definition of a 
security community. The General Plan for Regional Security, the data bank for information 
relevant to the security (SISME), the subregional cooperation of the police institutions as 
well as the Mercosur Centre for Police Training are results of the work of the Conference of 
the Home Secretaries. 
The starting point for this cooperative process implies the establishment of a trilateral com-
mand of the Federal Police at the border triangle between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay in 
May 1996. Even in the same year the Conference of the Home Secretaries was established. 
The Conference of the Home Secretaries of the Mercosur has been able to achieve a great 
number of security politically significant agreements since then. Amongst them are, for ex-
ample, the following agreements signed at the end of the 1990s: Agreement on Security Po-
litical Exchange of Information; Agreement on Security at the Border Triangle; as well as the 
Agreement on Cooperation and Mutual Support in the Field of Regional Security.  
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The Foreign Policy Coordination in the Mercosur 
A basic requirement for the work of the mentioned committees is the coordination of the 
foreign policies of the member states of the Mercosur. It is true that the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs are together with the Ministers for Economic Affairs at the head of the Mercosur 
Council (CMC). However, there is a broad range of duties of the highest ranking Mercosur 
body, namely the realization of the objectives defined in the treaty from Asuncion and fi-
nally the establishment of a common market. Therefore the foundation of a foreign political 
consultation body of its own was necessary. As early as in 1996 the Presidents of the Merco-
sur countries had expressed their political willingness to create a special Minister of Foreign 
Affairs forum by the signing of the Declaration from Potrero de los Funes. Consequently 
two years later the multilateral FCCP was founded. 
This auxiliary body of the Mercosur Council is usually casted with high-ranking employees 
of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the member states. If the “nature and reach of the sub-
jects dealt with requires it”, the Consultation Forum may also have a meeting on the level of 
the Presidents. The priority of the FCCP is the “expansion and systematisation of the politi-
cal cooperation” between the member states. As a result the FCCP is planned to represent a 
common position of the member-countries opposite “third states, groups of states or other 
international institutions”.  
It is not presumptuous to identify the FCCP as the embryo of a common foreign and security 
policy of the Mercosur countries, which is still a long way to go. Since the Mercosur Council 
has assigned the responsibility for the Minister Conferences without direct economic and 
commercial political relevance to the FCCP in 2002 at the latest, the crucial channels of 
communication for the coordination of the foreign and security policies of the member states 
gather in this forum. Thus the CMC-decision 2/02 instructs the FCCP amongst other things 
to “accompany and coordinate” the work of the Conferences of the Home Secretaries as well 
as the working groups against terrorism, illegal arms trade and drug trafficking. 
Apart from this the FCCP has to be concerned with the establishment of the Mercosur as an 
engaged and responsible actor of the international system. This can be achieved by articulat-
ing previously and commonly agreed on positions concerning question on the regional and 
international policy. So the representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Merco-
sur worked together within the FCCP in the run-up to the meetings of the Rio-group, the 
Summits of the Americas, the Ibero-American Summits and other international conventions, 
especially in the context of the Organization of American States. The coordination of bire-
gional agreements of the Mercosur – for example with the Andes Community and the Euro-
pean Union – is another competence of the Political Concertation- and Consultation Forum 
as well as treaties relating to international law between the Mercosur and single states. 
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Furthermore the member states of the Mercosur coordinate their voting behaviour in the 
General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations within the FCCP. Special 
importance was attached to this fact before the second Iraq-intervention led by the USA in 
2003. The Mercosur states represented at the UN Security Council at the time, Brazil and 
Chile, strengthened themselves in their disapproving attitude in the FCCP and voted to-
gether – despite considerable pressure from Washington – against a military intervention in 
the authoritarian state. The agreement between Argentina and Brazil on exclusively giving 
common votes in the UN Security Council until 2006 (see El País, December 19, 2003) was 
also taken in the FCCP. A working group employed by the FCCP formed a cooperation 
mechanism for consular questions. As a result common diplomatic representations of the 
Mercosur countries in third countries may be established since August 2000. Argentina and 
Brazil are residing in Boston and Hamburg in common consulates, for instance.  
 
The Conference of the Home Secretaries of the Mercosur 
The Conferences of the Home Secretaries of the Mercosur states originate from the Agree-
ment of Fortaleza from 17 December 1996, in which the signatory countries state their will-
ingness to cooperate in questions of transnational security. For this purpose semi-annual 
meetings are being held since 1997, which take usually place in the Mercosur country hold-
ing the rotational presidency. The agreements met at the Conference of the Home Secretaries 
are documented in the protocols11 and transferred to the Council of the Mercosur, which 
acknowledges them and integrates them as council decisions into the legal system of the 
Mercosur. 
Four cooperation mechanisms are of great importance for the future subregional security 
collaboration and shall be briefly introduced. These cooperation mechanisms have derived 
from the Conferences of the Home Secretaries over the last years and represent a qualitative 
further development of the security cooperation in the Mercosur: The General Plan for Re-
gional Security, the Mercosur Centre for Police Training set up at the Conference of the 
Home Secretaries in Rio de Janeiro in 2000, the operative police cooperation decided in 
Asuncion in 2001 as well as the security data bank SISME implemented in Montevideo in 
2003. In the following the basic principles of the practical subregional security political co-
operation will be spell out and critically appreciated. Since most of the analysed forms of 
collaboration are still in their initial stages, an estimation of their respective effectiveness/ 
deficiencies is hardly possible at this moment. 
                                                     
11  The following paragraph is mainly based on the protocols of the Conference of the Home Secretar-
ies of the Mercosur, which the Brazilian Ministry of Justice has kindly made available for the au-
thor.  
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The General Plan for Regional Security (Plan General sobre Cooperación y Asistencia Recíproca 
en materia de Seguridad Regional en el Mercosur) became effective in 1999. In this General Plan 
the Security Plan for the border triangle worked out as well as the Regional Security Plan 
from 1998. The General Plan for Regional Security represents by far the most comprehensive 
and furthest-reaching multilateral project of the Conference of the Home Secretaries of the 
extended Mercosur. Introductorily it says: 
“The parallel running processes of the globalization and the regional integration lead 
to the stage where even the transnational dimension of the criminality proves to be in-
creasingly more pronounced and thus more alarming. Amongst others organized 
groups in the sectors of drug traffic, terrorism, money laundering, smuggle, child 
trade, robbery and theft of vehicles, illegal dealing with radioactive material, illegal 
migration and environmental criminality belong to this sector. [...] In order to respond 
these new challenges it is necessary to act commonly and in a coordinated way on the 
regional level. Only by means of cooperation the different forms of the nationally and 
transnationally organized criminality can be contained effectively. Particularly those 
forms of crime that can – due to their transnational character – not be contained on the 
national level threat the common subregional security to a high degree.” 
For the improvement of the subregional security situation the states of the Mercosur aim to 
coordinate four central security political fields of function. Firstly the government bodies of 
security and police are intended to support each other mutually by the exchange of informa-
tion. Secondly on the operative level simultaneous measures are planned to be executed for 
the control and repression of criminal activities. Thirdly the Home Secretaries want to im-
prove the material equipment of the police institutions – especially in the important sectors 
of computer science and communication – and adjust subregionally. Finally the General 
Plan for Regional Security aims at a more effective employment of the personnel resources. 
This is planned to be achieved by further developed and coordinated forms of training as 
well as a broad emphasis on exchange of experience between the security and police staff of 
the Mercosur. 
The central chapter of the General Plan for Regional Security is divided into those problem 
areas in which the partnership countries intend to cooperate in the future: Illegal drug traf-
ficking, slave trade, smuggle, robbery respectively theft of vehicles, organized crime, eco-
nomic and financial crime, terrorism as well as environmental criminality. Following a Bra-
zilian initiative the Home Offices and Ministries of Justice are currently working on the 
transformation of the General Plan into an outline agreement. A multilateral treaty relating 
to international law would have to be ratified by the Parliaments of the Mercosur states. This 
would increase the pressure on the Congresses to adjust the national legislations to the Re-
gional Security Plan (Oswaldo Portella, interview on May 12, 2004). 
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The subregional data bank for information relevant to the security (SISME) dates back to an 
agreement of the third Conference of the Home Secretaries in Buenos Aires in 1998. Five 
years later the Home Secretaries and the Ministers of Justice decided in Montevideo to im-
plement the system still in 2004. By this the government representatives describe the ex-
change of information as a crucial element of an effective prosecution of transnationally act-
ing criminals. Their financial power enables these transnationally organized groups to pur-
sue their illegal objectives by means of advanced technologies. In order to be able to contain 
the organized crime effectively the government security authorities depend on technically 
equal equipment, especially in the fields of information and communication. The centraliza-
tion of the subregional government capacities shall lead to synergy effects. The exchange of 
information guaranteed by the SISME is intended to lead to considerable progresses con-
cerning the control of transnational criminality. 
Besides an improved organization and intensified control of the police institutions, that are 
often involved in illegal activities themselves, the utilization of the Mercosur data archive in 
connection with coordinated administrative procedures within the home ministries of the 
subregion also promises a speeding up of the crime control on the operative level. The 
member states have got to feed completed police operations into the data bank and thereby 
pass them on to the partnership countries. As well as data related to persons or information 
on goods (i.e. arms and vehicles) linked with criminal activities. 
In content the subregional information system is intended to consist of three components: In 
doing so data relating to persons and goods are completed by a register on criminal cases 
and the police operations connected with them. Data with reference to persons of the first 
component includes national as well as international arrest warrants, missing announce-
ments and summons as well as entry and departure prohibitions declared by the Mercosur 
countries. Furthermore the SISME stores information on issued and refused visas of citizens 
from non-Mercosur states as well as a register of notification of persons from a third country 
residing in the member states. 
The data relating to goods, which form the second component of the SISME, refer to confis-
cated vehicles, vessels and aircrafts in the first place. Moreover the model descriptions and 
serial numbers of seized arms are recorded and stored centrally. A subregional register for 
cargo containers recording the imports and exports to and from the Mercosur countries in-
cluding the respective freight is intended to enable the security authorities a detailed detec-
tion of the transportation routes of the smuggled goods. 
The third component of the subregional information system finally concerns a register for 
resolved and unresolved criminal cases by the police institutions of the Mercosur states. The 
stored information on police operations carried out in connection with criminal offences 
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contributes to the exchange of experience between the security authorities of the single 
states. On the basis of the SISME-data the state bodies dealing with a case or problem area 
can communicate with each other and decide on commonly or regionally coordinated meas-
ures on the operative level. 
In order to support the operative collaboration of the police forces of the Mercosur countries 
the Home Secretaries signed the Agreement on Police Cooperation in the Sectors of Investi-
gation, Prevention and Control of Criminal Offences (Acuerdo sobre la Cooperación Policial en 
la Investigación, Prevención y Control de Hechos Delictivos) at the eleventh Conference of the 
Home Secretaries in May 2001 in Buenos Aires. They decided the intensified collaboration 
between the federal polices of the Mercosur states. The exchange of information between the 
authorities in charge is planned for those cases, in which the preparation or execution of a 
criminal offence affects the majority of the Mercosur states directly or is for various reasons 
of interest for several states. Cooperation requests of the neighbouring police may lead to 
the opening of a case and the introduction to concrete investigations into persons and 
groups associated with criminal offences in the Mercosur area. However, a mutual exchange 
of information is also possible on crimes featuring repeated patterns of operation in a state 
respectively the modus operandi of the organized crime. The SISME is intended to represent 
the infrastructure for the exchange of information and cooperation requests between the 
federal polices. The police authorities use the communication media available for the time 
being (telex, fax, and email) until the communication system is put into complete operation. 
At the same time special communication mechanisms are planned to be established between 
the authorities in the subregion. 
The transnational prosecution of criminal offenders in the Mercosur area is also settled the 
agreement. Policemen on duty are legitimated to cross the state border provided the crimi-
nal offender(s) had been caught in flagranti. In order to act on the national territory of the 
neighbouring country the federal police in charge of the respective scene of crime only has 
to inform its counterpart and ask for support to the arrest of the prosecuted criminal of-
fender. This regulation implies a theoretically significant progress concerning the practical 
crime control. After all before the signing of the Mercosur agreement the prosecution au-
thorities had to ask the International Police (Interpol) for international arrests warrant first, 
which was far more complicated and lengthier. 
In November 2000 the eighth Conference of the Home Secretaries of the Mercosur in Rio de 
Janeiro decided the foundation of a coordination Centre for Police Training (Centro de Coor-
dinación de Entrenamiento Policial del Mercosur). The cross-disciplinary character of the coor-
dination centre is intended to support the continuous scientific-technological development 
of the formation contents. On the one hand the coordination centre encourages the exchange 
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of experience between the national police schools; on the other hand the regional training 
centre is able to advise the national actors pedagogically and technically. To be precise this is 
about developing subregionally adjusted training schemes and evaluating the training- and 
practise programs carried out in the member states afterwards. For this purpose a data ar-
chive was set up, which gives an annual overview of all training programs offered by the 
police academies of the Mercosur. The coordination of the training programs serves the 
purpose of supporting common prevention- and repression measures of the police that aim 
at transnationally acting criminals, too. 
It has to be criticized that the Home Secretaries have not assigned a seat of their own to the 
Centro de Coordinación de Entrenamiento Policial del MERCOSUR. Instead departments have 
been set up in the national Home Offices respectively Ministries of Justice, which are in-
structed with the subregional coordination. The member state holding the rotational presi-
dency of the Conference of the Ministers appoints the Director of the Centre for Police Train-
ing. However, a leadership that changes half-yearly does not contribute to the constancy of 
the coordination between the national police academies and their course contents. Apart 
from the working group of the Conference of the Home Secretaries only a Secretariat respec-
tively a Secretary – who the Director recruits from his own Ministry – supports the Director 
of the Police Training Centre. 
By the subregional agreements in the sectors of training, exchange of information and opera-
tive cooperation the member states of the Mercosur have created the political frame and the 
instruments for the common transnational crime control. The following paragraphs will il-
lustrate to what extent the operationalisation of the security political defaults has been suc-
cessful in two central problem areas. Security experts agree on ranking the organized drug 
trafficking and delicts linked with it the priority problem. International terrorism on the 
other hand is rather considered to be a potential security risk that has to be prepared for in 
the best possible way. In this context the security political influence of the hegemonic power 
USA on the subregion plays a significant part. 
 
Organised Drug Trafficking 
Above all in the General Plan for Regional Security the Conference of the Home Secretaries 
of the Mercosur sets a frame for the common control of the illegal drug trafficking, in which 
the responsible authorities of the member states are asked to realize simultaneous and coor-
dinated anti-drug operations. At irregularly carried out common police raids in the border 
regions the Federal Police is in command in the national territory of which the prevention- 
and repression measure is realised. The partnership institutions are merely invited to send 
observers. Besides the selective exchange of information between the drug control authori-
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ties, monthly secret briefings on a multilateral level are intended to give information on 
transportation routes, hidden runways, techniques of smuggling, drug laboratories, cultiva-
tion, caches, results of interrogations and the like.  
Beyond the Conference of the Home Secretaries the Special Committee RED (Reunión Espe-
cializada de Autoridades de Aplicación en Matéria de Drogas, Prevención de su Uso Indébido y Reha-
bilitación de Dependientes de Drogas del Mercosur) deals with the regional drug problems 
within the Mercosur in particular. Within the member states the National Anti-Drug Bu-
reaus mostly based in the Presidential Office are responsible for the coordination of the 
subregionally coordinated control of drug production, -trafficking and use of drugs. The key 
tasks of the Anti-Drug Committee imply the prevention of drug abuse and the rehabilitation 
of drug addicts. At the same time the repression of drug offences and therefore the problem 
of illegal drug trafficking including the illegal activities implied (such as money laundering) 
are also subsumed by the generic term prevention.  
The programmatic domains of the RED can be gathered from the technical Subcommittees 
that have so far been established for the control of the illegal trade with chemical substances, 
the laundering of drug funds, the reduction of the drug demand and the harmonization of 
the legal systems. Until now the exchange of information and regional intelligence coordina-
tion have dominated the working agenda of the RED. By these mechanisms progresses in 
the control of the trade with pharmaceutical products and chemical substances were meant 
to be achieved in particular. In order to enable a more efficient control of the trade with me-
dicaments that are potentially used for the production of drugs, the Mercosur countries 
committed themselves to inform each other on the export of relevant pharmaceutical prod-
ucts. For this purpose national registers of the import and export of pharmaceutics are 
planned to be set up in the member states. For the repression of the illegal trade with chemi-
cal drugs the Federal Police has carried out the transnational operation Seis Fronteras coordi-
nated by the RED in 2002 and 2003. In the course of the coordinated raids carried out simul-
taneously in all Mercosur states the security officers arrested numerous drug dealers, confis-
cated chemical drugs and destroyed their production sites. Furthermore the government 
representatives stated their willingness to develop complementary strategies for the protec-
tion of their borders. The drug control strategies are equally meant to include control meas-
ures and public education regarding the risks implied by the use of drugs. In doing so the 
representatives of the Mercosur countries emphasize that the social factors take priority 
within the analysis of causes as well as within the possible solutions of the drug problems. 
This realization is owed to a pilot project for the reduction of the drug demand in which 
related municipals of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay participate. Each 
time respectively two neighbouring municipals cooperate, the state borders of which cover a 
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distance of 7,100 kilometres altogether. On the one hand the integration of the border dis-
tricts is intended to be supported by means of transnational activities in the sectors of pre-
vention, police investigation and public education. On the other hand the population of the 
border towns is meant to be mobilised and sensitised to the drug problems. In order to 
achieve these aims first of all multipliers were integrated into the project via information 
meetings. These agents included teachers, doctors, local politicians and police officers. In a 
second step binational anti-drug councils were established in the municipalities, which dealt 
with legal and illegal aspects of the use of drugs and the drug demand in content. They also 
organized discussion meetings on the subject. The six months lasting pilot project ended in 
December 2004. 
 
Transnational Terrorism 
The foundation of a Working Group for Counterterrorism (Grupo de Trabajo Especializado 
sobre Terrorismo – GTE) had already been set up in the General Plan for Regional Security 
passed in 1999, thus well before the terrorist attacks from September 11, 2001 in New York 
and Washington. A crucial moment for the inclusion of the international terrorism in the 
regional security agenda can be seen in the bomb attack to the Israeli Embassy in Buenos 
Aires in 1992 and the Israeli-Argentine Association AMIA (Asociación Mutual Israelita Argen-
tina) in 1994. By these attacks more than 100 people have been killed altogether in the coun-
try with the largest Jewish community in South America. The Israeli secret service Mossad 
holds the Islamic Republic Iran and the Hisbollah responsible for the bomb attacks. The al-
ready mentioned Comando Tripartito de la Triple Frontera was founded in 1996 as a result of 
this up until today unresolved crime. Moreover, the just described transnational security 
cooperation has been started after that. 
It is correct that the Anti-Terrorism Working Group (GTE) is getting unequally more atten-
tion since the Common Declaration of the Home Secretaries of the Mercosur from Septem-
ber 28, 2001. In this declaration the Ministers reacted to the Al Quaida-attacks on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon and announced a far-reaching collaboration against this new 
quality of terrorist danger. Therefore the GTE was completed by a Permanent Working 
Group (Grupo de Trabajo Permanente – GTP) via modification of the General Plan for Regional 
Security. Since then the GTE has been subordinated to the GTP. The meetings of the counter-
terrorism experts take place in the context of the GTE. The participating experts include rep-
resentatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Ministries of Finance and Justice, agents 
of the intelligence services as well as counterterrorism- and secret service departments of the 
Federal Police. Within these committees the representatives of the Mercosur governments 
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coordinate their positions concerning the problem of global terrorism in international fo-
rums such as the OAS and the UNO. 
On the GTE’s and GTP’s initiative the Conference of the Home Secretaries prepared 
at least three crucial multilateral treaties: The Agreement on the Operative Cooperation 
of the Police Intelligence Services in Counterterrorism, the Agreement on the Cooperation in 
the Control of Transnational Criminal Activities linked with Illegal Air Traffic as well as 
the Agreement on the Fight against Corruption in the Border Regions between the Merco-
sur states. 
The actual tasks of the Working Groups (GTE/GTP), meeting twice a month since 2000, in-
clude the exchange and the analysis of information as well as the evaluation of current op-
erations concerning potential terrorist activities in the Mercosur area. In practice this is 
about permanently observing relevant sectors of the organized crime (arms trade, drug traf-
ficking, money laundering) and investigating, if there are indications of links to terrorist 
groups (Robson Robin da Silva, interview on May 21, 2004). 
The operative part of counterterrorism is controlled by the national secret services: The Chil-
ean Agencia Nacional de Inteligencia (ANI) founded only in 2004, the Argentine SIDE (Secre-
taria de Inteligencia del Estado Argentino) and in Brazil the Department of Intelligence Service 
of the Federal Police (Diretoria de Inteligência Policial) and especially its Counterterrorism 
Department SANTER (Secretaria Antiterrorista). However, even the Secret Service Central in 
the Brazilian Presidential Office ABIN as well as the military intelligence services are inte-
grated into the terrorism control and -prevention. The Working Group for Biological De-
fence (Grupo de Trabalho Biodefesa) of the ABIN deals with scenarios that anticipate biological 
and chemical terrorist attacks. There are close contacts between the intelligence services of 
the other Mercosur states. Representatives of the national intelligence services meet for regu-
lar conferences as well as ad-hoc gathering, if the situation requires it. The persons in charge 
rather proceed on the assumption of a possible attack on Israeli, US-American or British in-
stitutions situated in the subregion than on Brazilian targets, for instance (José Antonio de 
Macedo Soares, interview on May 14, 2004). 
In order to stabilise communication channels the Conference of the Home Secretaries in-
structed the Anti-Terrorism Working Groups to develop an integrated information system 
with person related data about members of terrorist alignments and those persons that sup-
port terrorist activities. This information intended for the internal use should only be made 
available for the judicial authorities in the state of emergency. This condition raises ques-
tions concerning the national control, since the national intelligences are not really con-
trolled by their Parliaments either. For the time being the General Plan for Regional Security 
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does neither plan to feed data relating to terrorism into the subregional information system 
SISME nor data relating to all other delicts. Additionally the GTP and GTE established insti-
tutionalised communication mechanisms (Sistema de Consulta Rápida) to guarantee the im-
mediate communication of the anti-terrorism experts of the Mercosur states in case of urgent 
dangers respectively unexpectedly executed terrorist attacks. For this purpose weekly con-
ferences of the GTP (Tuesday 10 am to 12 noon) and the GTE (Friday 10 am to 12 noon) sup-
ported by communication media are taking place continuously. Every two months the GTE 
works out an evaluation of the situation, in which the risks regarding potential terrorist ac-
tivities in the Mercosur area are assessed. So far no particular trouble spot for the states in 
the South of Latin America could be discovered. 
In September 2004 the Ministers of Defence of the extended Mercosur discussed the future 
role of the intelligence services of the Armed Forces in the context of counterterrorism in 
Buenos Aires (see La Nación, September 14, 2004). On this occasion the Argentine Minister 
of Defence Pampuro spoke for an increased integration of the military attachés into the ter-
rorism prevention. They should intensify their cooperation with the military intelligence 
services of their receiving states, particularly in the Mercosur region. The then Brazilian 
Minister of Defence Viegas pointed out that the containment of terrorism was not a purely 
military task. Therefore an improved coordination between the military and civil intelli-
gence services of the Mercosur states was necessary. Viegas’ Chilean colleague Michelle 
Bachelet took a similar view by emphasizing the “great variety of the anti-terrorism meas-
ures available” (ibid.) and pointing out that the military means were not at all given priority 
by this. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
Since the transitions to democracy Argentina, Brazil and Chile have managed to overcome 
the anarchic basic condition of the international relations postulated by the realistic theory 
for the most part by cooperative government and social interactions. The subregional insti-
tutions play a central role in guaranteeing the peaceful change in the intraregional coopera-
tion within Southern Latin America. First and foremost are the political and economic insti-
tutions of the Mercosur: The Mercosur Council, the Group of the Mercosur, the Technical 
Secretariat, the Appellate Court and the Committee of Permanent Representatives. In the 
second line are the Mercosur authorities that are responsible for security policy cooperation: 
The conference of the Home Secretaries and Ministers of Justice, the Foreign Political Con-
sultation Mechanism (FCCP), the Anti-Drug Committee (RED) as well as the Counter-
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Terrorism Working Groups (GTP/GTE). A third type are the bilateral institutions in charge 
of defence policy cooperation between the ABC states: The Brazilian-Argentine Consultation 
and Coordination Mechanism for International Security- and Defence Affairs (MCC/MAE), 
the Argentine-Chilean Permanent Security Committee (COMPERSEG) as well as Brazil’s 
Bilateral Working Groups for Defence Policy (GTBD). 
The results of the analysis of the security and defence policy institutions show that these are 
on the whole “strong and disseminated enough in order to generate an expectation of a 
peaceful change over a long period of time” (Deutsch 1961: 98). It is true that the defence 
political cooperation mechanisms have been attested democratic deficiencies, because mili-
tary actors are over-proportionally represented in these committees. However, by reversing 
it positively especially the transnational cooperation of the military in the MCC/MAE and 
the GTBD promotes common, social processes of learning and identity building of the mili-
tary representatives from the ABC states. The military nationalism and the overestimation of 
the term of national sovereignty in the military academies of the region (Nunn 1997: 12) can 
be regarded as cooperation hampering qualifiers. The extent of collective identity forming 
between the Argentine, Brazilian and Chilean generals cannot be finally assessed, which is 
partially due to the non-public character of the bilateral cooperation mechanisms. The cen-
tral criterion established by Deutsch (1961: 98) for achieving a sense of community “[…] that 
there has to be agreement at least in one point: That common social problems can be and 
have to be solved by procedures of peaceful change” is already fulfilled by the military and 
defence political cooperation by definition.  
On the whole even in view of the common values and identities that Deutsch defined as 
components of a security community the common grounds between the ABC states prevail. 
In this connection the “we-feeling” of the states of Southern Latin America follows from the 
common esteem for market economy, democracy and human rights. Additionally it is in-
creased by the poverty of great parts of the population and the high income concentration as 
common social problems connected with it. The societies of the ABC states had been attested 
increasing mutual interdependence, especially in the sector of the subregional economic 
relations in the context of the Mercosur. The increase of trade and direct investments as well 
as the formation of regional networks between enterprises, company unions, chambers of 
commerce and trade unions had led to this conclusion. Opinion surveys by which the popu-
lation of the ABC states has mostly got a positive image of one another today are an indica-
tor of developing collective identities in Southern Latin America. Another mutuality of the 
governments implies their preference for multilateral solutions and the high esteem for the 
international law within the international relations.  
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Finally the analysis of intraregional relations had awarded generally centripetal effects on the 
subregional cooperation to the non-military threats. The increasing diplomatic concertation 
(agreed votes in the UN Security Council, common diplomatic representations in third coun-
tries) and processes of institutionalisation of security and defence policies also imply a con-
siderable contribution to increasing the degree of mutual interdependence between the ABC 
states in the sectors of foreign, security and defence policy. All in all, the mutual interde-
pendence of the member states of the security community has to be rated higher than the 
interlocking of the ABC states with external actors. 
On the political level the Conferences of the Home Secretaries and the FCCP are the most 
important forums for dialogue between the member states concerning transnational threats 
and common means of their control. Since the end of the 1990s the security agreements 
signed at the semi-annual Conferences of the Home Secretaries have grown into a compre-
hensive normative catalogue, which points to an advanced degree of institutionalisation of 
the security cooperation in the Mercosur. The high number of working groups and special 
committees employed by the Conferences of the Home Secretaries are now forming an insti-
tutional structure of their own that is comparable with the economic-political cooperation 
mechanisms of the integration alliance. 
The main tasks of the FCCP are the coordination of the foreign and security policies of the 
Mercosur states and the development of common positions in negotiations with external 
actors. The degree of institutionalisation of this committee is still relatively small compared 
to the Conference of the Home Secretaries, but in spring 2002 the Mercosur Council has as-
signed far-reaching security policy competences to the FCCP. It remains to be seen how the 
FCCP will use its coordination function (i.e. between the Conference of the Home Secretaries 
and the RED). The Consultation and Concertation Forum has undoubtedly the potential of a 
common foreign and security policy of the Mercosur. If the governments of the Mercosur 
states pursue this political objective, the mentioned cooperation mechanisms are the infra-
structure that can put it into effect. 
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